An unusual question has arisen before the Supreme Court of India — can one bench pursue contempt proceedings when the Chief Justice of India (CJI) himself has chosen to pardon the offender? The issue stems from a shocking courtroom incident in which a senior advocate attempted to hurl a shoe at the CJI during proceedings. On October 6, 2025, 71-year-old advocate Rakesh Kishore created chaos in the Supreme Court’s courtroom. While the Chief Justice of India, D.Y. Chandrachud, was presiding over a hearing, Kishore allegedly shouted slogans and attempted to throw his shoe toward the bench. He was quickly restrained by security officers and taken out of the courtroom. The incident drew immediate condemnation from across the legal fraternity and political circles. Many senior advocates described the act as a grave assault on the dignity of the judiciary and demanded strong disciplinary action. The Bar Council of India (BCI) swiftly suspended Kishore’s license to practise law, describing his conduct as inconsistent with the dignity and ethics of the legal profession. In response, the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) filed a petition seeking to initiate criminal contempt of court proceedings against the advocate, arguing that the act amounted to an open and deliberate attempt to scandalize and lower the authority of the highest court in the country. The petition also sought directions to prevent the glorification of the act on social media platforms, where certain posts and videos were portraying the incident in a celebratory manner. The SCBA urged the Court to issue preventive guidelines or a “John Doe” order to curb such online content. The association emphasized that the act occurred in open court, directly undermining public confidence in the institution, that the advocate had continued to justify his actions publicly despite the CJI’s pardon, and that the glorification of the event online could encourage similar acts in the future. When the matter came up before a bench comprising Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, the central legal question emerged: if the CJI, the person directly affected by the contempt, decides to forgive and not initiate proceedings, can another bench of the Supreme Court still take up the case for contempt? Justice Surya Kant remarked that the advocate’s behaviour clearly constituted serious and grave contempt of court but questioned whether the Court could now reopen the matter when the CJI had already exercised his discretion to let it go. The Court observed that under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, when an act of contempt takes place in the presence of the court, it is up to the judge concerned to decide whether to initiate action. Since the Chief Justice chose to pardon the offender, the bench noted that it may not be within the authority of another bench to revive the proceedings. Justice Kant stated, “Throwing a shoe in the courtroom is undoubtedly contempt on the face of the court. However, the CJI, in his magnanimity, decided not to proceed. The question now is — can we override that decision?” Appearing for the SCBA, senior advocate Vikas Singh contended that the CJI’s decision not to pursue contempt was made in a personal capacity as the presiding judge on that day and argued that the institution itself — the Supreme Court as an entity — retains the power to act to preserve its dignity and authority. He also noted that the situation had evolved since the CJI’s pardon, as the advocate had made public statements glorifying his act and social media posts were circulating that further demeaned the judiciary. According to Singh, this constituted fresh or continuing contempt, separate from the original incident that the CJI chose to overlook. “The entire institution’s reputation is at stake. If such acts are glorified, it sends a wrong message to society,” Singh told the bench. The judges acknowledged the gravity of the issue but expressed caution, noting that excessive focus on the individual might inadvertently glorify the offender, giving him more public attention than he deserves. Justice Surya Kant remarked that highlighting him further may only help glorify his actions instead of deterring others. The Court appeared inclined toward issuing guidelines and preventive measures rather than initiating immediate criminal contempt proceedings, emphasizing that while the act was undeniably contemptuous, the judiciary must also show restraint and maturity in responding. The bench suggested exploring measures such as stricter courtroom security and behavioural protocols to prevent disruptions, clear guidelines for advocates’ conduct and disciplinary consequences for misconduct, and monitoring mechanisms for online content that glorifies contemptuous acts against the judiciary. The matter was adjourned for a week to allow the SCBA and the Attorney General to submit written suggestions on preventive mechanisms. This case raises important questions about the limits of judicial forgiveness and institutional authority. When the CJI personally decides to pardon an act of contempt, it is both a display of individual grace and judicial restraint. However, it also creates ambiguity — whether that decision binds the entire institution or leaves room for others to act in defence of judicial dignity. Legal experts note that this situation could set a significant precedent. If another bench is allowed to pursue contempt after the presiding judge pardons the offender, it could imply that institutional authority supersedes individual discretion. On the other hand, if no further action is permitted, it would reinforce the principle that contempt on the face of the court can only be acted upon by the judge before whom it occurs. Beyond the technicalities, the incident has reignited debate about decorum, dissent, and discipline within the legal profession. While advocates are expected to represent their clients fearlessly, they are equally bound by the duty to uphold the respect of the court. The Bar Council’s suspension of Kishore’s license was a reminder that professional misconduct cannot be tolerated, even under the guise of protest or ideology. The legal community has largely stood united in condemning the act, emphasizing that disagreement with the judiciary’s decisions must always remain within lawful bounds. The Supreme Court now faces a delicate task — balancing judicial restraint with the need to protect institutional dignity. The bench’s forthcoming decision will determine not only the fate of this particular case but also how future acts of courtroom misconduct are treated when pardoned by the presiding judge. In essence, the Court’s question — “Can another bench pursue contempt action when the CJI has pardoned?” — goes far beyond one incident. It strikes at the heart of how the judiciary defines its collective authority, compassion, and control in a rapidly changing public and digital environment.
